External Review Process Tha an Org Elects to Undergo

Last Updated: November 2, 2021

Mis- and disinformation tin can undermine public conviction in the balloter procedure, as well as in our democracy.  Elections are administered by state and local officials who implement numerous safeguards to protect the security of your vote pursuant to various state and federal laws and processes. This resource is designed to debunk common misinformation and disinformation narratives and themes that relate broadly to the security of ballot infrastructure and related processes. It is non intended to address jurisdiction-specific claims. Instead, this resources addresses election security rumors by describing mutual and mostly applicative protective processes, security measures, and legal requirements designed to protect against or detect large-scale security issues related to election infrastructure and processes.

You can learn more about mis- and disinformation from CISA's Mis-, Dis-, Malinformation (MDM) squad. Click an icon below to become directly to that section.

New Rumor Vs. Reality

Reality: Safeguards protect the integrity of the mail-in/absentee election process, including relating to the use of postal service-in/absentee ballot request forms.

Rumor: People can easily violate the integrity of the mail-in/absentee ballot request process to receive and cast unauthorized mail-in/absentee ballots, or forestall authorized voters from voting successfully in person.

Go the Facts: Election officials utilise various security measures to protect the integrity of the mail-in/absentee voting process, including those that protect against the unauthorized use of ballot request forms, in states where such forms are used, the submission of mail-in/absentee ballots past ineligible individuals, and eligible in-person voters beingness erroneously precluded from beingness able to vote due to existence listed in the poll book as having received a postal service-in/absentee ballot.

Mail service-in/absentee election request forms typically require applicants to sign the form and assert their eligibility to cast a mail-in/absentee ballot nether penalization of police. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot request form, election officials implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of the applicant prior to sending the applicant a postal service-in/absentee ballot. Such procedures include checking the signature and data submitted on the class confronting the respective voter registration record, likewise equally ensuring that multiple postal service-in/absentee ballots are not sent in response to applications using the aforementioned voter's information.

Election officials further implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots. Those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots are required to sign the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope. In some states, a notarized signature, the signature of a witness or witnesses, and/or a copy of valid identification is likewise required. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot, election officials verify the signature on the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope and/or that the mail service-in/absentee ballot has been otherwise properly submitted prior to retrieving the ballot from its envelope and submitting it for counting. Some states notify the voter if there is a discrepancy or missing signature, affording the voter an opportunity to right the issue.

State policies vary on how to handle an in-person voter who is listed in the poll book every bit having been sent a post-in/absentee ballot. In most states, the voter would exist required to cast a conditional ballot that could be later reviewed by election officials. In others, the voter may cast a regular ballot and any respective mail-in/absentee ballot returned in the proper noun of that voter would be rejected. In all such cases, instances of potential double voting or voter impersonation could exist directed to appropriate authorities for investigation.

Useful Sources

• Mail-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Assessment, CISA
• Mail-in Voting in 2020 Infrastructure Risk Infographic, CISA
• Post-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• USPS Ballot Mail Information Center, USPS
• How States Verify Absentee Ballot Applications, NCSL
• How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots, NCSL
• States That Permit Voters to Correct Signature Discrepancies, NCSL
• 52 U.s.a.C. § 21082
• Provisional Ballots, NCSL
• Land Policies on Voting In-Person or Irresolute Vote After Requesting a Mail/Absentee Ballot, NASS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-country directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor25

Reality: Robust safeguards protect against tampering with ballots returned via drop box.

Rumor: Drib boxes used by election officials to collect returned mail-in/absentee ballots can exist easily tampered with, stolen, or destroyed.

Become the Facts: Election officials utilise diverse safeguards to protect ballots returned by voters via drop boxes from being tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. Drop boxes located outdoors are typically fabricated of heavy and high-form metallic, bolted to the ground, and include security features such every bit locks, tamper-evident seals, minimally sized ballot insertion slots, and burn and water-harm prevention features. Drib boxes located indoors are typically staffed and protected past existing building security measures. Many election offices monitor their drib boxes via 24-hour video surveillance. Ballots returned via drib box are retrieved by election officials or designated individuals, often in bi-partisan teams, at frequent intervals.

Useful Sources

• Election Drop Box, Election Infrastructure Subsector's Government Coordinating Council and Sector Coordinating Council Joint COVID-xix Working Group
• Ballot Drop Box Definitions, Design Features, Location, and Number, NCSL
• Voting Exterior the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Post and other Voting at Abode Options, NCSL
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-land directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor24

Post-Election

Reality: Ballot treatment procedures protect against intentional or unintentional election destruction.

Rumor: Ballots can hands be destroyed without detection, preventing them from being counted.

Become the Facts:States take ballot processing and tabulation safeguards designed to ensure each ballot cast in the ballot can exist correctly counted. Country procedures often include robust chain-of-custody procedures, auditable logging requirements, and canvass processes. Election officials utilise these security measure to check that votes are accurately deemed for during processing and counting.

Per federal law, all ballots, applications, and registrations related to elections for federal offices, such equally those for President and Vice President, Members of the U.Southward. Senate or House of Representatives, must be retained and preserved for 22 months from the appointment of the election. In addition, many states also require specific state and local security protocols for stored ballots, such equally storage in a secure vault featuring double lock systems that can only be opened when authorized representatives from both political parties are present. This requirement is intended to ensure all ballots and relevant records, such equally voter registrations, cannot be discarded, but are bachelor in example they are needed for recounts or audits to resolve whatever potential issues.

Election officials, based on state and local constabulary, may discard non-relevant materials, such equally addressed envelopes or duplicate applications. Taken out of context, images or video of election officials discarding papers may appear suspicious , but are likely depicting legal discarding of these non-relevant election materials.

Useful Sources:

• 52 U.S.C. § 20701
• Retention Chart for Boards of Elections, State of Ohio
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or country election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor22

Reality: Variations in vote totals for unlike contests on the aforementioned ballot occur in every ballot and do not by themselves point fraud or problems with voting technology.

Rumor: More votes in i competition than other contests on the election means that results cannot exist trusted.

Get the Facts:Variations in vote totals for different contests on the aforementioned ballot occur in every ballot. For example, this tin occur as a result of "undervotes." These variations by themselves are not indications of issues with voting engineering science or the integrity of election processes or results.

An undervote occurs when a voter intentionally or unintentionally does not make a pick in a given contest on their ballot (e.g., a voter votes for a presidential candidate, but not for any candidates in other contests on their ballot) or, where a voter selects fewer than the maximum number allowed for a particular contest. Undervotes commonly occur on so-called "down-election" races. For instance, a voter may choose to vote for president, senator, and governor, but not for other offices or ballot measures that are lower down on their ballot. Even if a ballot includes an undervote in a particular competition, properly marked votes on their ballot are counted.

Useful Sources

• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Voter Intent Laws, NCSL
• Post-Election Audits, NCSL
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor20

Reality: Robust safeguards including canvassing and auditing procedures assist ensure the accuracy of official election results.

Rumor: A bad actor could change election results without detection.

Get the Facts: The systems and processes used by election officials to tabulate votes and certify official results are protected by various safeguards that help ensure the accuracy of ballot results. These safeguards include measures that help ensure tabulation systems function equally intended, protect against malicious software, and enable the identification and correction of any irregularities.

Every state has voting system safeguards to ensure each ballot bandage in the election can be correctly counted. State procedures oft include testing and certification of voting systems, required auditable logs, and software checks, such every bit logic and accuracy tests, to ensure ballots are properly counted before election results are made official. With these security measures, election officials tin check to decide that devices are running the certified software and functioning properly.

Every land besides has laws and processes to verify vote tallies earlier results are officially certified. Country processes include robust concatenation-of-custody procedures, auditable logs, and canvass processes. The vast majority of votes cast in this election volition exist cast on paper ballots or using machines that produce a newspaper audit trail, which let for tabulation audits to be conducted from the paper record in the event whatever issues sally with the voting organisation software, audit logs, or tabulation. These canvas and certification procedures are as well by and large conducted in the public eye, as party representatives and other observers are typically allowed to be present, to add an additional layer of verification. This means voting system software is not a single point of failure and such systems are subject to multiple audits to ensure accuracy and reliability. For case, some counties bear multiple audits, including a post-election logic and accuracy test of the voting system, and a bipartisan hand count of newspaper ballots.

Useful Sources

• Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations Infographic, CISA
• Ballot Infrastructure Cyber Adventure Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Post-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated October 29, 2020), CISA
• Postal service-Ballot Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Your local or state ballot officials. EAC country-by-state directory
• Post-election audits, NCSL
• Policies for Election Observers, NSCL
• Tabulation Security, Maricopa County AZ
• Link direct to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor17

Reality: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Bureau (CISA) exercise not design or audit ballots, which are processes managed past state and local election officials.

Rumor: DHS or CISA printed newspaper ballots with security measures and is auditing results as a countermeasure against election counterfeiting.

Get the Facts:While DHS and CISA aid states and localities with securing election infrastructure, DHS and CISA do non blueprint, print, or audit ballots. Country and local ballot officials manage election design and printing, as well every bit the auditing of results.

Local election offices have security and detection measures in place that make it highly hard to commit fraud through apocryphal ballots. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with land and local election laws and practices, election security measures can include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise newspaper weights.

DHS and CISA operate in support of land and local election officials, and do not administrate elections or handle ballots. CISA's role in election security includes sharing information, such as cyber threat indicators, with state and local election officials, also as providing technical cybersecurity services (e.g., vulnerability scanning) upon the request of those officials. CISA funded an independent third-party to develop an open-source election auditing tool for voluntary use by state and local election officials. (Note: The previous judgement was updated nine Nov 2020.) CISA does non audit elections and does not accept admission to the tool as states use information technology.

Useful Sources

• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Ballot Security, DHS
• Federal Function in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, CRS
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting 2020 Hazard Cess, CISA
• Chance-Limiting Audits with Arlo, Voting Works
• Your local or state election officials EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor19

Reality: Election results reporting may occur more slowly than some voters expect. This lone does non indicate a problem with the counting procedure or results, or that there are issues affecting the integrity of the election. Official results are not certified until all validly bandage ballots take been counted, including ballots that are legally counted afterwards election night.

Rumor: If results every bit reported on election night change over the ensuing days or weeks, the process is hacked or compromised, so I can't trust the results.

Become the Facts:The timeline for reporting ballot results may exist impacted by a number of factors, including changes to land or local level policies that impact how the ballot is administered, changes to when ballots tin can be processed, or additional protocols implemented to brand voting and vote processing safer during the pandemic. Election results reported on election nighttime are ever unofficial and are provided solely for voters' convenience. In fact, no country requires that official results be certified on election night itself. Fluctuations in unofficial results reporting volition occur during and after ballot nighttime as more ballots are processed and counted, ofttimes including armed forces and overseas ballots, and validated provisional ballots. Variations in state processes may also mean ballots cast through unlike methods (e.g., early on in-person voting, mail-in voting, and election 24-hour interval voting) are counted and unofficially reported in dissimilar orders. Official results are released after rigorous canvassing (verification) and certification by local and state election officials.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results
• Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations, CISA
• Post-in Voting 2020 Run a risk Assessment, CISA
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated October 29, 2020), CISA
• Mail service-Ballot Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• USPS Ballot Mail Data Center, USPS
• Federal Election Results FAQs, CRS
• State Election Canvassing Timeframes and Recount Thresholds, NASS
• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Ballot, NCSL
• Election Security Country Policies, NCSL
• Changes to Post in Voting in 2020, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor14

Reality: Conditional ballots are counted in every ballot regardless of result margins.

Rumor: Provisional ballots are but counted if there's a close race.

Go the Facts:All provisional ballots are reviewed by election officials in every election regardless of outcome margins. Conditional ballots bandage by individuals whose eligibility can exist verified are counted. Additionally, election officials are required to provide individuals who cast provisional ballots written information regarding how they can determine whether their vote was counted and, if information technology was not counted, the reason for its rejection.

Useful Sources

• 52 The statesC. § 21082
• Post-Ballot Procedure Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Conditional Ballots, NCSL
• State Policies on Voting In-Person or Changing Vote After Requesting a Mail/Absentee Election, NASS
• Your local or country ballot officials. EAC land-by-country directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor15

Reality: In some circumstances, elections officials are permitted to "duplicate" or otherwise further mark cast ballots to ensure they tin can be properly counted.

Rumor: Witnessing ballot officials mark ballots means that fraudulent voting is taking place.

Get the Facts:Some ballots cannot be read by a election scanner due to issues such as impairment or misprinting. Some jurisdictions manus count such ballots, while others create indistinguishable ballots so they can be read by a ballot scanner. Some jurisdictions let election officials to enhance markings on ballots that are too faint to scan following a process to adjudicate the voter's intent based on land law. In jurisdictions where duplication of unscannable ballots is permitted, election officials indistinguishable the ballot precisely to ensure all the voter's choices are transferred correctly to the new ballot. Both the original and duplicate ballot are labeled and logged and then that the 2 ballots can be tracked and audited. Many jurisdictions require bipartisan teams of two or four personnel to consummate this process and verify that votes are accurately transferred to duplicated ballots. The process is often open to public observation.

In some jurisdictions, ballot duplication is referred to equally election remaking, ballot replication, or ballot transcription.

Useful Sources

• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Ballot, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication weblog serial, Council of Country Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials EAC state-by-state directory.
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor16

Reality: Ballot night results are non official results.

Rumor: If election dark reporting sites experience an outage, vote counts will be lost or manipulated.

Become the Facts: Election nighttime results are not official results. These sites may experience outages due to a variety of issues including too many people trying to view the site or cyberattacks. Such disruptions do not bear on the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Ballot results fabricated bachelor on election nighttime are ever unofficial. Official results are rigorously canvassed (reviewed), and certified past local and state ballot officials. Virtually states have requirements for postal service-election audits as well.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow But Not Preclude Voting
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Federal Election Results FAQs, CRS
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor11

Reality: A defaced or manipulated election night reporting webpage would not impact counting and certification of official results.

Rumor: If the ballot dark reporting webpage is defaced or displays wrong results, the integrity of the election is compromised.

Get the Facts: If a webpage has been defaced or is displaying incorrect results, information technology would not impact the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Ballot results fabricated available on election night are always unofficial.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Foreign Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2020 Election Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Irksome But Not Prevent Voting
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor12
  

Reality: Malicious actors can utilize fake personas and impersonate real accounts.

Rumor: If a social media account claims an identity, the account must be run by that person or organization.

Get the Facts:Malicious actors oftentimes use fake personas and impersonate real accounts to trick the public into believing disinformation, including ballot-related disinformation.

Pop social media platforms such every bit Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and others provide an indication, such as a checkmark that is either blue or grey, to signal that an account is verified by the platform.  If an business relationship claims to be a well-known person or official organization but is not verified, they may be an imposter.

There are multiple things to look for if you think an account is false or spoofed. Is the business relationship brand new? Do they create content or merely re-share? Do they have a coherent profile description and does it friction match what they are sharing? Practise they have a real profile photo?  A best practice when looking for election-related information is to get to trusted sources, similar your local ballot official.

If yous detect a suspicious social media post or business relationship, consider reporting the activity to the platform so others don't get duped. Most platforms have a "written report" function congenital into posts, so it's easy to report suspicious items, such as misinformation about ballot infrastructure. If an account is posting election disinformation, consider reporting to your state or local election official.

Useful Sources

• Election Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Toolkit, CISA
• #TrustedInfo2020, NASS
• Voter Resources: Land Voter Data, NASED
• Voting and Elections Data, usa.gov
• Your local or state ballot officials EAC country-past-land directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor1

Reality: Cyber actors tin "spoof" or forge email sender addresses to look similar they come from someone else.

Rumor: I received an election-related e-mail that looks similar it came from a sure organization, so the organization must accept sent information technology.

Get the Facts:Cyber actors tin forge emails to look like they came from someone else. This common tactic is chosen email spoofing, where attackers send an e-mail pretending to be from a specific domain or system in an attempt to harvest personal data or spread malware. Such spoofed emails can besides exist used to disseminate fake or inflammatory data. To send realistic-looking emails, cyber actors may forge the sender accost to hide the origin of an e-mail or gear up spoofed domains that have a slightly different name from the real domain. Always be wary of out of the ordinary emails and look to trusted sources, such as the organization's official website, in lodge to verify. Never provide personal information or download files from suspicious emails. If you receive a suspicious ballot-related email, consider reporting information technology to your local election official or local FBI field office.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Spoofed Internet Domains and Email Accounts Pose Cyber and Disinformation Risks to Voters
• Actions to Counter E-mail-based Attacks on Election-Related Entities, CISA
• Enhanced Electronic mail and Spider web Security, CISA
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor2

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Pre-Election

Reality: Voting systems undergo testing from state and/or federal voting system testing programs, which certify voting system hardware and software.

Rumor: Voting organisation software is not reviewed or tested and tin be easily manipulated.

Go the Facts:Before utilize in elections, voting systems undergo hardware and software testing to ensure they are consistent with land and/or federal requirements. Under these programs, voting arrangement manufacturers submit systems to undergo testing and review past an accredited laboratory or state testers. This testing is designed to cheque that systems role as designed and meet applicative state and/or federal requirements or standards for accuracy, privacy and accessibility. Certification testing unremarkably includes a review of a system'southward source code likewise equally environmental, security and functional testing. Depending on the land, this testing may be conducted by a land-certified laboratory, a partner academy, and/or a federally certified testing laboratory.

Earlier local jurisdictions acquire voting systems, voting systems must go through a testing process to ensure compliance with the state'due south standards and, in many states, federal standards as well. While each state sets specific standards for voting systems, many states leverage the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines developed by the U.Southward. Election Assistance Committee.

One time systems are accounted compliant with applicative state and federal standards, jurisdictions also conduct logic and accurateness testing before deployment of a voting machine to ensure proper functioning and to find any malicious or anomalous software problems. Post-election audits as well help ensure the proper performance of voting equipment.

Useful Sources:

• 52 The statesC. §§ 20971, 21081
• Voting System Certification Process, EAC
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Ballot Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NCSL
• Mail-Election Audits, NCSL
• Your local or country ballot officials. EAC state-past-land directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor23

Reality: Voter registration list maintenance and other election integrity measures protect against voting illegally on behalf of deceased individuals.

Rumor: Votes are existence cast on behalf of dead people and these votes are being counted.

Become the Facts: Land and Federal laws prohibit voter impersonation, including casting a ballot on behalf of a deceased individual. Election officials regularly remove deceased individuals from voter registration rolls based on expiry records shared by state vital statistics agencies and the Social Security Administration. While there tin can be some lag time betwixt a person'southward death and their removal from the voter registration list, which can lead to some mail service-in ballots beingness delivered to addresses of deceased individuals, decease records provide a strong audit trail to identify any illegal attempts to cast ballots on behalf of deceased individuals. Boosted ballot integrity safeguards, including signature matching and information checks, further protect against voter impersonation and voting by ineligible persons.

In some instances, living persons may return mail service-in ballots or vote early on in-person, then die earlier Election Day. Some states permit such voters' ballots to be counted, while others disallow such ballots and follow procedures to identify and reject them during processing.

Taken out of context, some voter registration information may announced to suggest suspicious activity, but are actually innocuous clerical errors or the result of intended data practices. For case, ballot officials in some states employ temporary placeholder data for registrants whose birth date or year is not known (e.one thousand., 1/1/1900, which makes such registrants announced to be 120 years old). In other instances, a voting-historic period kid with the aforementioned proper name and address as their deceased parent could be misinterpreted as a deceased voter or atomic number 82 to clerical errors.

Useful Sources

• 18 U.s.C. § 1708
• 52 U.s.C. §§ 10307(c), 20507, 20511(2), 21083(a)(2)(A)
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Take chances Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Security, DHS
• The National Voter Registration Deed of 1993: Questions and Answers, DOJ
• Election Mail Information Center, USPS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-land directory
• Maintenance of State Voter Registration Lists, NASS
• What If an Absentee Voter Dies Before Election Twenty-four hour period?, NCSL
• Voter Listing Accurateness, NCSL
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor21

Reality: Some voter registration data is publicly available.

Rumor: Someone possessing or posting voter registration information means voter registration databases accept been hacked .

Become the Facts: Some voter registration information is public information and is bachelor to political campaigns, researchers, and often members of the public, frequently for purchase. According to a recent FBI and CISA public alert, cyber actors may make false claims of "hacked" voter information to undermine conviction in U.S. democratic institutions.

Useful Sources

• Availability of State Voter File and Confidential Information
• FBI-CISA Public Service Proclamation: False Claims of Hacked Voter Data Likely Intended to Bandage Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Access To and Utilize Of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor3

Reality: Online voter registration websites tin experience outages for non-malicious reasons.

Rumor: An online voter registration website experiences an outage and claims are fabricated the election has been compromised.

Get the Facts: Outages in online voter registration systems occur for a diversity of reasons, including configuration errors, hardware issues, natural disasters, communications infrastructure issues, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Every bit CISA and FBI warned in a recent public alarm, a organization outage does not necessarily mean the integrity of voter registration information or any other election system has been impacted. When an outage occurs, election officials work to verify the integrity of voter registration data.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Probable Intended to Bandage Dubiousness on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Your local or state ballot officials EAC state-by-country directory
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor4

Reality: A compromise of a state or local government system does not necessarily mean election infrastructure or the integrity of your vote has been compromised.

Rumor: If state or local jurisdiction information technology (IT) has been compromised, the ballot results cannot be trusted.

Get the Facts: Hacks of state and local IT systems should not be minimized; however, a compromise of land or local IT systems does not mean those systems are election-related. Even if an election-related organization is compromised, a compromise of a organisation does not necessarily mean the integrity of the vote has been affected. Ballot officials have multiple safeguards and contingencies in identify, including provisional ballots or backup paper poll books that limit the impact from a cyber incident with minimal disruption to voting.  Additionally, having an auditable paper tape ensures that the vote count can be verified and validated.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Proclamation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow But Non Prevent Voting
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Cess and Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor5

Reality: Malicious actors can fake manipulation of voter registration data to spread disinformation.

Rumor: Videos, images or emails suggesting voter registration information is beingness manipulated means voters will non exist able to vote.

Get the Facts: Claims are easy to fake and can be used for disinformation purposes. If voter registration data were to exist manipulated, states have several safeguards in place to enable voters to vote, including offline backups of registration data, conditional ballots, and in several states, same-day registration.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Probable Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Securing Voter Registration Systems, NCSL
• Link straight to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor6

Reality: Safeguards are in place to forbid home-printed or photocopied mail-in ballots from being counted.

Rumor: A malicious role player tin easily defraud an election by printing and sending in extra post-in ballots.

Get the Facts: This is false. Committing fraud through photocopied or dwelling-printed ballots would be highly difficult to exercise successfully. This is because each local election office has security measures in place to detect such malicious activity. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with state and local election laws and practices, such security measures include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise paper weights.

Useful Source

• Mail-in Voting Ballot Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor7

Reality: Safeguards are in place to protect against fraudulent voting using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).

Rumor: A malicious actor can hands defraud an election using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).

Get the Facts:Changing an election using fraudulently submitted FWABs would be highly difficult to do. This is considering election offices have security measures in place to find such activity.

The FWAB is primarily used every bit a backup ballot for military and overseas voters who requested but did non nonetheless receive their absentee ballot. FWAB users must provide their signature and meet varying state voter registration and absentee election request requirements, which tin include provision of full or partial social security number, state identification number, proof of identification, and/or witness signature.

Since only military and overseas voters are eligible to use the FWAB, relatively few of them are submitted each ballot. In 2016, states reported that only 23,291 total FWABs were submitted nationwide, with all merely half dozen states receiving less than 1,000 FWABs statewide. Since utilize is relatively rare, spikes in FWAB usage would be detected as dissonant.

Useful Sources

• 52 United statesC. § 20303
• Voting Assistance Guide, FVAP
• Election Forms and Tools for Sending, FVAP
• 2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Study, EAC
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor8

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Ballot Twenty-four hour period

Reality: Election officials provide writing instruments that are approved for marker ballots to all in-person voters using mitt-marked paper ballots.

Rumor: Poll workers gave specific writing instruments, such every bit Sharpies, only to specific voters to cause their ballots to be rejected.

Get the Facts: Ballot jurisdictions allow voters to marker ballots with varying types of writing instruments, based on state law and other considerations such as tabulation system requirements. Poll workers are required to provide approved writing devices to voters.

Although felt-tip pens, like Sharpies, may bleed through ballots, some election officials accept stated that ballot tabulation equipment in their jurisdictions can still read these ballots. Many jurisdictions even design their ballots with get-go columns to forbid any potential bleed through from impacting the ability to easily scan both sides of ballots.

If a ballot has bug that affect its power to be scanned, it can be manus counted or duplicated, or adjudicated past election officials, who apply defined procedures such as concatenation of custody to ensure protect ballot secrecy and integrity. Many states additionally have "voter intent" laws that allow for ballots to exist counted even when issues such as bleed-throughs or stray marks are present, as long every bit the voter'south intent can still be determined.

Useful Sources

• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication blog serial, Council of State Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor18

Reality: Voters are protected past state and federal police from threats or intimidation at the polls, including from election observers.

Rumor: Observers in the polling place are permitted to intimidate voters, campaign, and interfere with voting.

Go the Facts:While nigh states take a process to permit a limited number of credentialed or registered observers at in-person voting locations to observe the voting process, state and federal laws offer voters general protection from threats and intimidation, including from observers. States utilise varying terms for observers, including "poll watchers," "challengers," and "poll agents." In general, observers are prohibited from violating election secrecy, candidature, collecting private voter information, and obstructing or interfering with the voting procedure. Observers in some states may report potential issues to election officials, such as questioned eligibility of a voter, suspicious behavior, or suspected rule violations. Intimidation or threatening beliefs is never permissible.

Nether certain circumstances, the U.South. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division may monitor polling place procedures for the protection of voters under federal voting rights laws. International observers, including delegations from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Organization for American States, who have been invited by the U.S. Section of State, may too observe in-person voting processes in some states.

If you feel that you've been a victim of, or witnessed, voter intimidation or threats, please report the experience to the DOJ Civil Rights Division'southward Voting Department past phone 800-253-3931 or through its complaint portal at https://civilrights.justice.gov/. If you experience an emergency, please call 911.

Useful Sources

• 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(one)(A), xviii United states of americaC. § 594, 52 U.s.a.C. § 20511, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
• Election Crimes and Security, FBI
• Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, DOJ
• About Federal Observers and Ballot Monitoring, DOJ
• Country Laws on Poll Watchers and Challengers, NASS
• Poll Watchers and Challengers, NCSL
• Policies for Election Observers, NCSL
• OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation The states 2020 Factsheet, OSCE
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor13

Reality: Safeguards are in place to protect ballot secrecy.

Rumor: Someone is claiming to know who I voted for.

Get the Facts:Election secrecy is guaranteed by law in all states. Election officials implement various safeguards to protect voters' choices from being viewable or knowable by others, including the election officials themselves. With few exceptions, these security measures ensure that individual ballots, once cast, cannot be traced dorsum to the voters who cast them. For in-person voting, privacy measures include dividers between voting stations and requirements that poll workers maintain distance from voters while they are casting their ballots. For postal service-in and provisional voting, election officials follow strict procedures to ensure ballot secrecy when ballots are retrieved from mail-in and provisional ballot envelopes.

Ballot secrecy rights may be voluntarily waived by voters in certain circumstances, and waiver may be required in some of these, such as armed services and overseas voters that vote by fax or email.

While ballot choices are secret in almost all circumstances, a voter'south party amalgamation and history of voting generally are not. Information contained in voter registration records, such equally name, address, phone number, and party amalgamation (in states with party-based voter registration), is by and large available to political parties and others. This data also regularly contains information on whether a voter voted in a item ballot, but not their ballot choices.

Useful Sources

• Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail service and other Voting at Home Options, NCSL
• Secrecy of the Ballot and Ballot Selfies, NCSL
• States that are Required to Provide Secrecy Sleeves for Absentee/Mail Ballots, NCSL
• Access To and Use of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor9

Reality: Polling place lookup sites can experience outages for not-malicious reasons.

Rumor: If polling identify lookup sites experience an outage, election infrastructure must have been compromised.

Become the Facts: Polling place lookup sites, similar all websites, may feel outages for a variety of reasons, impacting their availability to voters. Polling place lookup sites are not continued to infrastructure that counts votes and are typically segmented from infrastructure that enables voting, such equally the voter registration database. Election officials will point potential voters to alternate tools and resources for this information in the event of an issue.

Useful Sources

• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or land election officials EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor10
  

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Source: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol

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